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UNEASY FEDERALISM-STATE WATER LAWS
AND NATIONAL WATER USES*
Frank J. Trelease**
In late 1979 the Associated Press disseminated the following news
story:
Cedar City, Utah. (AP) Governor Scott Matheson Monday threatened to
withdraw his support of the MX missile if the military tries to assert federal
water rights for the proposed project in Utah and Nevada.
[Matheson was] addressing a U.S. House subcommittee heaing ....
... Matheson told the subcommittee that he supports deployment of the
missile in Utah, but he added that, "if at any point, the Air Force, because
of difficulties or costs encountered, attempts to assert a federal water right
for this project, I want them to know that I will withdraw my support for the
MX project."
He demanded an "ironclad commitment" from the Air Force that it
would not assert federal water rights in order to acquire project water.
Matheson said that the military must guarantee to secure water in accord-
ance with state law.t
The proposed MX missile system will be a huge shell game, an intri-
cate network of railway loops over which a limited number of missiles
can be shuttled between thousands of launching pads or "shelters." If the
Soviets should launch a strike aimed at knocking out America's capability
for a counterstrike they will not know under which shell was the pea, and
the sheer number of shelters would make it impossible for them to destroy
all U.S. missiles. This $33 billion scheme has been called the world's
largest construction project. Large amounts of water will be needed for
building and maintaining it and for the workmen and military personnel
who would construct and man the system, and there is not much water on
the Utah desert. 2
* Walker-Ames Lecture, University of Washington, Seattle, Washington, April 10, 1980.
** Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, Sacramento, Califor-
nia; Dean Emeritus, University of Wyoming College of Law.
1. The Sacramento Bee, Nov. 6, 1979, § D, at 25, col. 1.
2. To be more fair than the reporter, the news item reported approximately seven percent of the
Governor's remarks, picked out of a thoughtful analysis of the social, economic, cultural, and envi-
ronmental impacts of the MX, and the roles and responsibilities of the state and nation dealing with
them. Hearings on Proposed MX Missile Deployment Before the Subcomm. on Military Construction
Appropriations of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 37-49 (1979) (state-
ment of Governor Scott M. Matheson of Utah).
Washington Law Review
The Governor's objection was not to the United States getting the wa-
ter, nor to the United States getting a water right, 3 but to the possibility
that the United States would claim the water under its national defense
powers rather than under Utah's water law. He said:
As Governor of the State of Utah I need an ironclad commitment from the
Air Force that they at no time will assert Federal water rights, reserved or
unreserved. They must guarantee that all the water obtained by the Air
Force will be secured through the process outlined in Utah State law.4
A complete understanding of this statement requires an examination of
the uneasy coexistence of state and federal water laws.
I. WESTERN STATE WATER LAW
Western state water law grew out of the California gold rush, when
thousands of '49ers crowded the diggings at the mouths of the Sierra can-
yons and staked their claims on the streambeds and banks. They made
similar claims to the water needed to wash the gold from the gravel. Since
there was neither gold nor water enough for everyone, both were put on a
first-come-first-served basis. Claim jumping was discouraged by Colt and
Winchester. When the Great American Desert was found to be habitable,
the first settler in a valley took first choice of the land and took from the
stream enough water to irrigate it; the second comer had to make do out of
what was left.
The courts and legislatures of the western territories and states shaped
this crude self-made law into the doctrine of prior appropriation. 5 An ap-
propriation had to meet but one standard: it had to be for a beneficial use.
3. The Governor stated that the Utah State Engineer had reported that water in needed quantities
was available. Id. at 45.
4. Id. at 46. When the Governor threatened to "withdraw his support," he presumably meant his
political support. I am sure he had something in mind milder than either "nullification" South Caro-
lina style, or "interposition." See Goldberg, Interposition-Wild West Water Style, 17 STAN. L.
REV. 1 (1964). He could not, of course, block the United States from establishing a military installa-
tion in the State of Utah, although something like this was once tried by a governor of Arizona, who
in 1934 impressed the ferryboat Julia B. into the "Arizona Navy," and transported a detachment of
the National Guard up the Colorado River to the Parker Dam site, to rout construction gangs working
on a dam being built by the United States for the benefit of the City of Los Angeles. A second Fort
Sumter was avoided by the United States' tactical withdrawal of the construction crews. The parties
adjourned to the courtroom, where Arizona won a brief Pyrrhic victory, stopping the dam on a techni-
cal defect soon to be remedied by Congress. See United States v. Arizona, 295 U.S. 174 (1935). See
also R. NADEAU, THE WATER SEEKERS (1974).
5. McGowen, The Development of Political Institutions on the Public Domain, I I Wyo. L.J. 1,
8-14 (1956): Phillips, The Doctrine ofAppropriation: An Example of American-Born Common Law.
REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE AND
TRUST LAW 38 (1938).
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Practically all of the farmers, miners, manufacturers, power companies,
and cities of the West met this test when they took the water, since each
had a practical wealth-producing use in mind. Each use advanced the de-
velopment of the resources of the country,- and was an increment toward
maximization of the welfare of the people, the state, and the nation. Once
begun, an appropriation became a definite and identifiable piece of prop-
erty, lasting as long as the beneficial use continued. Its boundaries were
marked by the quantity diverted from the source, the place the diversion
was made, and its date, which identified it as superior or inferior to other
appropriations. This property right could be sold, and the use or place of
use could be changed, if the propef-formalities were observed.
To help you understand this-property aspect of water law, let me teach
you as I learned it. Fresh out of law school, I became an associate of L.
Ward Bannister of Denver, Colorado, one of the grand old "irrigation
lawyers" of a past generation. 6 One day he called me to his office while
he interviewed a farmer named Bergland, who had come into town with a
water case. Bergland was obviously a hard worker; he had worn his Sun-
day suit in to see the big city lawyer and I noticed how his biceps filled his
sleeves. Yet he was a very nervous and embarrassed man. The reason for
this appeared as he told the story. He got his water from the Brighton
Ditch Company, which served many farmers. One day he thought he had
not received his full amount, and won the argument by beating up the
ditch rider who doled out the shares. The ditch company promptly shut
and locked the headgate to his lateral and would give him no more water.
I thought this a funny story, but he did not, and I saw that he was not only
embarrassed but that he was frightened, scared to death. Why, I won-
dered, did he perhaps fear jail? I heard him say "and if I don't get water
in the next two or three days my corn will wither and my beets will har-
den." Then I understood: if he lost his crop he would lose a year's in-
come, he would miss a payment on the mortgage, and he would lose his
farm. On the high plains of northern Colorado, a farm is practically
worthless without water. As I watched this big, strong, scared man, I
learned what water law was all about. Water law ought to give to Berg-
land as good a water right as property law gives him a land right to his
farm. 7
6. Mr. Bannister represented the State of Colorado in the negotiations for the Colorado River
Compact of 1922. He lectured in water law at Harvard Law School and the University of Denver
College of Law.
7. Mr. Bannister picked up the telephone, called his friend the attorney for the ditch company,
told him some of the dreadful things that might happen to it, turned to Mr. Bergland and said, "You
will have your water in the morning." He charged Mr. Bergland a dollar for the telephone call.
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There is a second aspect of water law. Modem state water codes super-
impose a layer of administrative law on this property law. Rights are no
longer created solely at the will of the appropriator; now the state must
concur. Today's appropriator applies for a permit to construct the works
and to use the water, and a state official or agency decides whether there
is unappropriated water for the use and whether the use is beneficial. The
state officials determine the amount of water needed for the use and over-
see the construction of the works. Most important, a new requirement has
been added: the state agency may deny the application if to grant the per-
mit would be "contrary to the public interest.' 8 The agencies and courts
have developed this into a very important policy which has enabled them
to control water use with surprisingly modem and sophisticated economic
concepts. The public interest now incorporates the economist's max-
imization or efficiency principle, requiring water officials to choose from
competing projects the one that will produce the greatest net benefits. 9
Social costs have been recognized as grounds for denying or conditioning
permits for projects that would have very bad external effects on others. '0
The Utah Supreme Court, for instance, employed the notion of opportu-
nity costs in preventing a single-purpose appropriation from cutting the
heart out of a great multi-purpose project. I I In none of these cases did the
judges use the economist's language, but they had no difficulty in recog-
nizing and applying the economic concepts. In recent years legislatures
have embroidered on these themes; the Alaska and Washington prior ap-
propriation statutes contain express cost-benefit formulae' 2 and several
states identify specific recreational, fish, wildlife, and environmental
values that must be considered or guarded in the water permit review pro-
cess. 13 As a result, today the permit system forces appropriators to mod-
ify their projects to preserve environmental values. 14
Water law is thus a planning tool, a guide to action, an aid to decision.
A modem water plan is not a blueprint for every future project or use. If a
proposed new water use is for a beneficial purpose, does not affect prior
users, does not have deleterious side effects on other people, fish and
8. This legal device, now almost universal throughout the world, was invented by an engineer,
Elwood Mead, then state engineer for the infant state of Wyoming. 1890 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch.8, §
34. Mead was later United States Commissioner of Reclamation, and his monument is Lake Mead.
the water of the Colorado River stored behind Hoover Dam.
9. Young & Norton v. Hinderlider, 15 N.M. 666, 11OP. 1045 (1910).
10. In re Martha Lake Water Co. No.1, 152 Wash. 53, 277 P. 382(1929).
11. Tanner v. Bacon, 103 Utah 494, 136 P.2d 957 (1943).
12. ALASKA STAT. § 46.15.080 (1962); WASH. REV. CODE § 90.54.020(2) (1971).
13. ALASKA STAT. § 46.15.080 (1962); CAL. WATER CODE § 1257 (West 1971); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 537.170(3)(a) (1979); UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-8 (1953).
14. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 42 Cal.
App. 3d 198, 116 Cal. Rptr. 770 (1974).
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game, recreation, and the environment, and if it does not foreclose better
uses of the water, then it is a "planned" use, even though no one in
government ever thought of it. Of course, a state water plan may reserve a
stream for a specific project, or choose in advance to protect certain water
from exploitation, and in this fashion the modem water planning process
can be integrated with the permit procedure to provide policy guidelines
that determine, in the name of the public interest, the disposition of the
state's remaining unappropriated water. 15
II. FEDERAL WATER LAW
The federal government has little water law that resembles this state
water law. The national government does not concern itself with the prop-
erty rights of water users; it does not regulate the conduct of citizens or
plan what they may do with water. Federal water law deals primarily with
the powers, projects, programs, and properties of the federal government;
it governs the government. When the United States regulates the rivers
with huge dams to control floods and improve navigation, it has no "wa-
ter rights" as such. 16 When it deals with the problems of a great river
basin it needs no state permit or approval.17 Yet when it acts as a water
supplier and builds projects that furnish water for irrigation, municipal
and industrial purposes, it usually acts very much like a private appropria-
tor that seeks to store water for beneficial use. Most of these projects have
been built by the Bureau of Reclamation (now the Water Power and Re-
sources Service) and section 8 of the Reclamation Act of 1902 requires
the Secretary of the Interior, in carrying out a reclamation project, to pro-
ceed in conformity with the laws of the state "relating to the control,
appropriation, use, or distribution of water.... ,,8
The federal government often has need to use water on its own land.
Until a few years ago most agencies making such uses got state water
rights, almost as if there were a universal section 8. The National Park
Service got permits and adjudications for the needs of its tourists and per-
sonnel, the Forest Service for its campgrounds and small impoundments,
and the Bureau of Land Management for its stock water ponds. 19 At least
15. See WVYO. STAT. §§ 41-2-107 to 110 (1977); United Plainsmen Ass'n v. North Dakota State
Water Conservation Comm'n, 247 N.W.2d 457 (N.D. 1976).
16. Oklahoma v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508 (1941).
17. Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423 (1931).
18. 43 U.S.C. § 383 (1976).
19. See generally 1 C. Wheatley & C. Corker, Study of the Development, Management and Use
of Water Resources on the Public Lands (prepared for the Public Land Law Review Commis-
sion) 208-09, 238-40 (March 1969); see also United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 702-03
(1978).
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some military installations 20 and some Indian irrigation projects obtained
state permits to take needed water. 2 1
Yet before the turn of the century the Supreme Court had made it quite
clear that the states could not deny to the United States water needed for
the beneficial use of government property. 22 Early in this century, when
the federal government needed water for Indian reservations, it used this
power to create its own "reserved rights" to irrigate the reserved lands
set aside for the tribes. 23 Fairly recently federal officials have become
aware that water was needed to carry out federal purposes on other types
of reserved lands. Instream flows are desired for recreational uses or
scenic and aesthetic purposes, and the federal agencies fear that state wa-
ter rights, geared to utilitarian purposes and designed for diversion and
development, would not be suitable for these federal purposes.
The new federal reserved rights are a species of water right owned by
the federal government, created by the federal government to authorize
and protect water uses by the federal government on and in connection
with federal reserved lands. Their distinctive feature is that they bear a
priority as of the date the reservation of land was set aside, not when the
water use was started. Thus, an appropriator downstream from federal
reserved land who finds water available and puts it to use pursuant to state
law may not get the top prority although he is the first taker. Since
they were invented in 195524 and first applied in 1963,25 these rights
20. Nevada ex rel Shamberger v. United States, 165 F. Supp. 600 (D. Nev. 1958), aff'd on other
grounds, 279 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1960).
21. See United States v. Ahtanum Irrigation Dist., 236 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1956); Merrill v.
Bishop, 74 Wyo. 298, 287 P.2d 620 (1955).
22. United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899).
23. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908). In 1874, a large part of Montana was set
aside in the expectation that several tribes of the northern plains Indians could continue their way of
life there. When the area proved too small and the buffalo disappeared, the Indians began to starve. In
1888 they were easily persuaded to gather in a smaller reservation on the Milk River where they could
be given rations of beef, bacon, and flour. In order to help the Indians become self-sufficient farmers
and ranchers, an irrigation project was started, but it was then found that there was insufficient water
because upstream white settlers had appropriated the water to their lands. The Supreme Court came to
the rescue of the Indians, saying that both the Indians and the United States had intended to reserve
the water, the Indians to maintain command of the water that made their land valuable, the govern-
ment to insure the purposes of civilizing the Indians. In my opinion this is pure fiction. I believe they
simply forgot the water, or perhaps more accurately, did not think of it. An implied reservation of
water, like many an implied term of a contract or interpretation of a statute, is an afterthought sup-
plied by the court to fill a gap not seen by the original framers of the document. The court, armed with
hindsight, supplies the provision it thinks the legislators or parties might have inserted if they had
thought of it at the time.
Indian reserved rights present one of the knottiest problems in western water law. They are not the
subject of this paper, and what is said here about federal non-Indian reserved water rights has very
little to do with Indian reserved water rights.
24. Federal Power Comm'n v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435 (1955)(Pelton Dam case).
25. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 600-01 (1963).
756
State Water Law/National Water Uses
frightened the Berglands, the mining companies, and the cities of the
West, for many of them had water rights dating after the reservation of
upstream federal lands. If the government were to take the water for use
on the reserved land, it would have the better right, though not the first
use, and the first user could lose his water.
Within the past year the federal government has come up with a claim
to a new type of federal water right, what has come to be called the "fed-
eral non-reserved right." Much of the federal public domain is not re-
served lands. Theoretically, much of it can still be privately acquired un-
der a series of old land settlement and mining laws, although this is
becoming increasingly difficult. The old policy of disposition of the pub-
lic land to encourage settlement and development of the West has given
way to a new policy of retention and management. In managing its unre-
served public lands the government is discovering uses for water that it
again fears will not be recognized by state laws. The new claim is that the
national government can take or claim water for its national purposes
without regard to whether the state recognizes that purpose as a beneficial
use or whether the state laws will create and protect a right for it. The
federal non-reserved water right would bear a priority as of the date of
actual use or claim, so it does not threaten Mr. Bergland's vested rights.
However, federal uses outside the state pattern of water rights could have
a marked effect on the size and shape of future development within the
states, so they do scare Governor Matheson.
The state water laws allocate water to users, the nation's laws proclaim
it as a water user. The national government's reserved right presents a
threat to the property-protection function of state water law, and its non-
reserved rights threaten the development-guiding function. I think that
Governor Matheson is, in a very different way, as frightened as Mr.
Bergland. The direction and form of Utah's growth will depend to a large
degree upon water-who gets it, how much, from which source, under
what restraints, with what adjustments, and under what compromises.
The Governor fears that the future of his state may be decided in Wash-
ington, rather than in Salt Lake City. He fears that decisions affecting the
citizens of the state will be made not at the local or state level by the
affected people or their legislators and agencies, but by national officers
and administrators little informed or concerned about local matters.
While the states view the exercise of federal powers as a possible threat
to the property rights they have established and to the development they
prefer, the federal government sees state regulatory laws as potential state
controls over federal functions. When Governor Matheson squares off in
confrontation with the Air Force, he is reenacting an old role. State offi-
cials and federal agencies have long had a mutual distrust of the one's
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willingness or ability to fulfill the needs and desires of the other. Each
jealously claims its own jurisdiction and prerogatives and resents the ex-
ercise of the other's. When federal reserved rights appeared on the scene,
they not only scared the Berglands of the West but also frightened many
lawyers and law professors and inspired briefs, articles, and speeches by
the hundreds. I added to the heap one book, three chapters, two articles,
four speeches, and two draft laws. When I noticed that there were no
Berglands selling apples on the streets, no companies bankrupted by shut-
down of their mills, no cities losing population and industry because their
government had taken their water, I thought I could quit. 26 Yet each year
brings a new development, and I find myself taking up the cudgel again.
A new case seems to cut down reserved rights, but new claims expand
them. I am not sure it is progress to move from concern over reserved
rights to concern over non-reserved rights, but the latter threaten to spawn
as big a controversy as the former once did.
III. FEDERAL RESERVED WATER RIGHTS
For twenty-five years the western states have engaged in a mighty
struggle, first to disprove the existence of federal non-Indian reserved
rights, then to secure their repeal. Both efforts have failed, and the Su-
preme Court has now squarely espoused the doctrine of reserved rights
and has protected them as property rights of the government. 27 A whole
generation of federal bureaucrats has been educated as to their existence
and trained to enforce them to the hilt. Today, in numerous courts of the
Western States, a massive effort is being made to identify and quantify
these new-found rights and to weave them into the pattern of private
rights that date from the earliest settlements to the present. 28
Out of one of these state suits came the 1978 case of United States v.
New Mexico.29 At stake were the waters of the Rio Mimbres, a small
stream that serves a surprisingly large number of ranches and communi-
ties before it sinks into the desert. The United States claimed that when
the Gila National Forest was set aside in 1899, the government also set
26. Trelease, Federal Reserved Water Rights Since PLLRC, 54 DEN. L.J. 473 (1977).
27. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976); Colorado River Water Cons. Dist. v.
United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976)(dictum).
28. Appendix Ito a preliminary report of the Task Force on Federal Non-Indian Reserved Water
Rights lists 44 recently decided or pending cases in which federal non-Indian reserved water rights
were adjudicated. TASK FORCE 5a-PREsIDENT'S WATER POLICY IMPLEMENTATION, REPORT OF FED-
ERAL TASK FORCE ON NON-INDIAN RESERVED RIGHTS, app. I (June, 1979) (review draft) [hereinafter
cited as TASK FORCE REPORT]. Many of these cases involved claims to all the tributaries in a river
system in a large basin.
29. 438 U.S. 696(1978).
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aside some of the water. The claims were modest enough: small amounts
for residential use of Forest Service personnel and campers, for road
building, a tiny bit for wildlife, and an instream flow of six cubic feet per
second-a small brook-through the forest for "aesthetic, environmen-
tal, recreational and 'fish' purposes." 30 The Supreme Court gave the For-
est Service enabling acts of 1891 and 1897 a strict reading. 31 Those acts
had specified only watershed protection and timber supply in stating the
purposes for which the national forests were created, and the Court al-
lowed water only for these utilitarian objectives, not for the amenities
claimed. The Court seemed generally unsympathetic to the entire notion
of reserved rights. It emphasized that the quantities allowed would be
limited to "only that amount of water necessary to fulfill the purpose of
the reservation, no more";32 it held that reserved rights exist not for "sec-
ondary" or "supplemental" purposes, but only for those that qualified as
"direct." 33 "Necessary" was amplified to "essential"; the test applied
was whether, if water were not provided, "the purposes of the reservation
would be entirely defeated. '34
This was a substantial victory for the water users of the West. 35 The
enemy was not defeated but he was thrown back, and substantial territory
feared lost was recaptured. The decision confirmed, even strengthened,
my belief that reserved rights were of little moment and not likely to harm
many Berglands.
30. Id. at 704 (quoting Mimbres Valley Irrigation Co. v. Salopek, 90 N.M. 410, 412, 564 P.2d
615, 617 (1977)).
31. 438 U.S. at 705-13. For example, the government argued, id. at 707 n. 14, that the Organic
Administration Act of 1897, as codified in 16 U.S.C. § 476, should be read establishing three pur-
poses for national forests, one general and two particular. "No national forest shall be established,
[I] except to improve and protect the forest within the boundaries, or [2] for the purpose of securing
favorable conditions of water flows, and [3] to furnish a continuous supply of timber ...." 16
U.S.C. § 475 (1976). The Supreme Court demonstrated that the legislative history showed that this
should be read as intending only two purposes: "Forests would be created only 'to improve and
protect the forest within the boundaries,' or, in other words, 'for the purpose of [I] securing favor-
able conditions of water flows, and [2] to furnish a continuous supply of timber.' "438 U.S. at 707
n. 14 (emphasis in original).
32. Id. at 700 (quoting Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 141 (1976).
33. 438U.S. at702-03,714.
34. Id. at 700.
35. This opinion is not necessarily infallible dogma, nor even received doctrine. In an excellent
note, Quantification of Water Rights Claimed Under the Implied Reservation Doctrine for National
Forests, 54 WAsH. L. REv. 873 (1979), it is asserted that the decision does not provide adequate
protection for the national forests and deprives the implied reservation doctrine of the flexibility
which rendered it useful in balancing state and federal interests in water adjudications. With defer-
ence, I still believe that the national government can give its forests all the protection they need (see
text accompanying notes 67-68 infra), although it may have to pay for appropriated water it needs
and takes, and that the reservation doctrine is not a flexible balancing of interests but an owner-take-
all enforcement of property rights. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
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United States v. New Mexico did not dampen the spirits nor reduce the
efforts of the federal agencies. About that same time President Carter de-
cided to announce a definite written water policy, which he described as
an attempt to achieve "enhanced Federal-State cooperation" in water
policy, 36 and to "deepen the partnership" between the two levels of gov-
ernment. 37 He instructed the federal agencies to "work promptly and
expeditiously to inventory and quantify Federal reserved . . . rights,' '
38
focusing on high priority areas and working in "consultation with the
States and water users . . . emphasiz[ing] negotiations rather than litiga-
tion wherever possible. "39 Pursuant to directives that accompanied the
policy statement, a task force of water using agencies was set up, and in
June, 1979, it released a draft report for review. 40 The report recom-
mends a unified approach by all federal agencies, each furnishing a de-
scription of the types of claims to reserved rights, an inventory of reserva-
tions, purposes and water sources, and an estimate of the cost of
completely identifying and quantifying all water rights. It sets a timetable
of five years for current consumptive uses of water, ten years for "ac-
tual" non-consumptive uses of water and reasonably foreseeable future
consumptive and non-consumptive needs, extendable to fifteen years if
management plans require.4 1 The report's procedural recommendations
add to court adjudications a process of "notification" of the right identi-
fied and quantified by agencies and the negotiation of agreements for in-
corporating these into state systems. 42
The Task Force Report adds one possibly disturbing element to the fed-
eral reserved rights picture. It contains an assertion that there is a federal
reserved right to sustain "a groundwater level for general ecosystem
maintenance." 43 This right is identified only by stating that there is a
complete lack of information about the groundwater necessary to main-
tain range land, forest, and fluvial systems or to prevent salt water intru-
sion in coastal areas such as national seashores or coastal wildlife refuges.
36. President's Remarks Announcing the Administration's Federal Water Policy, I PUB. PAPERS
1978 at 1043 (1979).
37. Id. at 1043-44.
38. President's Message to the Congress Transmitting Federal Water Policy Initiatives. I PUB.
PAPERS 1978 at 1050 (1979).
39. Id.
40. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 28. Task Force 5a consisted of representatives from the
Department of Interior, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Defense, the Department
of Energy, and the Department of Justice. The Task Force was chaired by one Associate Solicitor for
Interior and coordinated by another, and representatives of the Department of Interior formed a ma-
jority of the staff of the task force. Id. at 3-4.
41. Id.at36-41.
42. Id. at 43-49.
43. Id.at4l.
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If this means that groundwater levels must be maintained at or near the
ground surface for subirrigation of large areas, it could result in locking
up potentially valuable resources. 44 Perhaps swamps and marshes re-
served as duck refuges or moose ranges must stay wet, but this grab at
the total groundwater may far exceed the "necessary and essential"
amount allowed in New Mexico. Coastal areas should be protected from
salt water intrusion, of course, but in Alaska, Washington, and Oregon
there are state groundwater laws that could handle the matter,45 and in
California, where it has been a serious problem, the federal government
might well enter into the local institutional arrangements that are operat-
ing a successful program of recharge, 46 thus achieving the objective with-
out sacrificing total use of the resource.
Simultaneously with the draft Task Force Report, the Solicitor of the
Department of Interior issued an opinion to guide the National Park Ser-
vice, the Fish and Wildlife Service, the Water Power and Resources Ser-
vice, and the Bureau of Land Management in making their claims to wa-
ter rights. 47 The reserved rights claimed by the Solicitor are fairly
modest. There are no surprises in the claims he makes for reservations of
water for national parks, monuments, recreation areas, and other areas
administered by the National Park Service, nor for the preserves and re-
fuges administered by the Fish and Wildlife Service. Indeed, following
the "specific purpose" test formulated in the New Mexico case, the Solic-
itor finds that public recreation is not a specific purpose of the National
Wildlife Refuge System; instead, it is a secondary purpose for which no
water is reserved. 48 He also finds that Bureau of Land Management
(BLM) lands designated as ranges "to protect and manage wild free-
roaming horses and burros" are not reserved lands, though designated
and maintained as sanctuaries, 49 so that the horses and burros will have to
drink water obtained under state law.
The Solicitor's one broad claim of a reserved right relates to "public
water holes and springs." In 1916 Congress authorized the President to
44. See generally Meyers, Federal Groundwater Rights: A Note on Cappaert v. United States,
13 LAND & WATER L. REV. 377 (1978).
45. ALASKA STAT. §§ 46.15.010-.270 (1962); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 537.505-.795 (1974); WASH.
REv. CODE §§ 90.44.020-.250 (1979).
46. See GOVERNOR'S OFFICE OF PLANNING & RESEARCH, CALIFORNIA WATER ATLAS 58 (W. Kahrl
ed. 1979).
47. Federal Water Rights of the National Park Service, Fish and Wildlife Service, Bureau of
Reclamation and the Bureau of Land Management, 86 Interior Dec. 553 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
Opinion]. This opinion was the first of the reports of individual agencies called for by the Task Force
Report, intended to guide the agency in the application of the report and to be attached to appendices
to the report.
48. Id. at 607.
49. Id. at 593-94.
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reserve "[1]ands containing waterholes or other bodies of water needed or
used by the public for watering purposes .... ",50 The legislative history
shows that this law was needed "so that a person can not monopolize or
control a large territory by locating as a homestead the only available wa-
ter supply for stock in that vicinity." ' 5 1 Most reserved springs and water
holes were withdrawn by an executive order in 1926.52 For these the So-
licitor abandons the restricted New Mexico approach. He states that the
purposes for which the public water holes and springs were withdrawn
"include stock watering and human consumption." 53 He goes on to add
such other purposes as:
(1) water for growing crops and sustaining fish and wildlife to allow the
settlers on the public land to obtain food for their families and provide for-
age for their livestock; and (2) water for flood, soil, fire and erosion con-
trol, the control of which was essential to protect the public and to allow the
new patentees and settlers on the public domain to make a viable living in
this ard and semi-arid region of the Nation where, for example, an uncon-
trolled prairie fire could completely destroy a home, life, belonging [sic],
livestock and forage. 54
"Springs and water holes" are held to include those tributary to
streams. 55 Furthermore, the Solicitor opines that the quantity of water
reserved at each public water hole or spring was the total yield of such
source. 56 Out of this cloth he would create a new type of federally granted
private water right, a system that rivals the state system of appropriation.
Persons who have acquired nearby lands may receive permission from the
Department of Interior to use these reserved waters beyond the area of
land reserved. 57 This invention seems totally at war with the "primary
purpose" doctrine of New Mexico, totally inconsistent with the rule that
only so much water is reserved as is essential for the purpose.
The Solicitor says that any appropriation under state law of the water of
a spring or water hole on federal land is a nullity, and that any entry on
the land for that purpose is a trespass. 58 This will certainly create conflicts
with those users of the public domain such as oil companies, mining
claimants, and ranchers who have appropriated water which is surplus
over stock water needs. Irrigators and other users of water downstream
50. 43 U.S.C. § 300 (repealed 1976).
51. H.R. REP. No. 35, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1916).
52. Public Water Reserve No. 107, Exec. Ord. of Apr. 17, 1926, 30 C.F.R. 758 n. 1 (1979).
53. Opinion, supra note 47, at 581.
54. Id. at581-82.
55. Id. at 587.
56. Id. at 582.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 588.
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from tributary springs may find their water taken under the newly created
"federal water rights law," if and when the federal government author-
izes others to use its new-found water wealth-wealth never discovered,
claimed, or used in the sixty-four years since the Stock Raising Home-
stead Act was enacted and the fifty-four years since the lands surrounding
the water holes were reserved.
In another respect this portion of the Solicitor's opinion is in conflict
with United States v. New Mexico. There too the Forest Service had
claimed the power to allocate water to private users, in that case cattle
ranchers, outside the structure of state water law, on the theory that the
United States had reserved the water. The New Mexico Court analyzed
several acts and administrative interpretations demonstrating turn-of-the-
century thinking that the state had exclusive control of the distribution of
water on public lands, and said, "there is no indication in the legislative
histories of any of the forest Acts that Congress foresaw any need for the
Forest Service to allocate water for stockwatering purposes, a task to
which state law was well suited." 59 Exactly the same thing should be said
of the Stock Raising Homestead Act and the executive order reserving the
water holes.
IV. THE FEDERAL NON-RESERVED WATER RIGHT
The real bombshell in the Solicitor's opinion came in the assertion of
"federal water rights obtained through appropriation and use for
Congressionally authorized purposes' '-federal rights to take unreserved
but unappropriated water for use on unreserved federal lands, or for "sec-
ondary" uses on reserved lands, without complying with state law. 60
The Solicitor first justifies such rights with variations on an old theme:
the myth that the federal government owns the unappropriated water. I do
not know why some lawyers and judges find it necessary to start with
"ownership." I do not believe anyone owns the water in the ocean, in a
cloud, in the raindrops, or in a stream. It is res nullius, the property of no
one, a concept that has been with us since Roman times. If I catch it in a
bucket, or behind a dam, perhaps it becomes mine, but if a state or nation
can permit me to or prevent me from doing so, perhaps it can be called
theirs. This "ownership," however, is obviously a conclusion, not a
starting place. 61 But the Solicitor begins with "ownership of all rights
appurtenant to" federal lands, 62 leans heavily on the rule that "only Con-
59. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696,717 (1978).
60. Opinion, supra note 47, at 574.
61. Trelease, Government Ownership and Trusteeship of Water, 45 CALiF. L. REv. 638 (1957).
62. Opinion, supra note 47, at 563.
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gress... has the authority under the Property Clause to control the dispo-
sition and use of [property] owned by the United States," ' 63 and ends
where he began, with the opinion that the United States "retains a propri-
etary interest in those waters that have not been appropriated pursuant to
state law. "64 He even embroiders on the myth, saying, quite erroneously,
that the common law rules of natural flow riparian rights originally ap-
plied to federal lands. 65 Then, in a tortuous trip through cases dealing
with the nineteenth century land laws, he finds, primarily from what they
do not say, "an assertion of inchoate federal water rights to unappropri-
ated waters .... *"66
63. Id. at 563,575.
64. Id. at 575.
65. Id. at 565. The Solicitor cites United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S.
690, 703 (1899), but the Court was there referring to state law and the lack of power of the states to
change the common law to the detriment of the United States. In other cases the Court has said that
riparian rights do not attach to federal lands. In Atchison v. Peterson, 87 U.S. 507, 512 (1875), the
Court said: "[Tjhe government being the sole proprietor of all the public lands, whether bordering on
streams or otherwise, there was no occasion for the application of the common law doctrine of ripar-
ian proprietorship with respect to the waters of those streams." And in Sturr v. Beck, 133 U.S. 541.
551 (1890), the Court quoted this statement and added, "when, however, the government ceases to
be the sole proprietor, the right of the riparian owner attaches, and cannot be subsequently invaded."
It is clear from the rest of the opinion that it attached in that case because of the Dakota Civil Code
which stated the riparian doctrine, not because of federal law. See also Boquillas Land & Cattle Co.
v. Curtis, 213 U.S. 339,344 (1909).
66. Id. at 565-66, 566-71. 1 used to think that one of the best and most useful works I had
performed was to lay to rest the ghost of the myth that the United States "owned the unappropriated
water on the public domain" because the Desert Land Act "severed the water from the land" and
gave the states some power over water but reserved the surplus to itself. See F. Trelease, Federal
State Regulations in Water Law (Legal Study No. 5, prepared for the National Water Commission)
111-116, 147-148 (including 147a through 147m), 306-309 (Sept. 7, 1971). Apparently, however.
no one has ever read these pages, and the theory continues to haunt me. I must have seen it since in a
half dozen law review articles. The Solicitor depends upon it heavily. A contemporary government
report repeats it. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RESERVED WATER RIGHTS FOR FEDERAL AND INDIAN
RESERVATIONS, CED-78-176 (1978). If Congress had clearly and unequivocally granted to the states
the power to dispose of some of the waters, or granted to members of the public water rights obtained
by complying with state law, then it would have impliedly acted on the theory that it owned all the
water, and therefore retained an interest in what was left. But since there was no real grant, as I
showed in Legal Study No. 5, to imply a grant and from the implied grant imply a claim to what was
not granted seems one bridge too far. The Solicitor's opinion waffles through the Mining Act of 1866
and the Patents Act of 1870 (now combined as 43 U.S.C. § 661 (1976)). and concludes that since
they "in effect" validated appropriations under state law and "in effect" waived U.S. claims to
appropriated water, they therefore asserted "inchoate rights to unappropriated waters that exist at any
point in time." Opinion, supra note 47, at 565. The Desert Land Act he finds a puzzlement, and
puzzling it is, if you try to read it as a federal water law, with its partial severence of some kinds of
water from some kinds of federal lands in some states, instead of as a land law with a provision that
the seller should get a state water right for as much as he needed, saving the surplus for others.
Though he despairs of finding authority for his thesis in the inconsistent "dicta . . . at war with one
another" in the cases construing these laws, he tenaciously clings to the United States' "inherent
power and control over its property" and predicts that the Supreme Court will resolve the conflict by
finding that nowhere in these acts, nor in the many disclaimers of intent to effect state water law, nor
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When he moves from proprietorship to supremacy, he is on firmer
ground. The Solicitor notes that the federal Constitution and laws are
"the supreme law of the land," and quotes the National Water Commis-
sion: "Anytime the United States needs water ... to carry out a program
authorized by the Constitution, it has ample power to acquire it. "67 This
of course comes from impeccable and irrefutable subordinate authority. 68
It is the theory I advanced to undercut the notion, quite prevalent a decade
ago, that if the United States did not have reserved rights, the purposes of
the reservations could be frustrated, state officials could deny water rights
for purposes the national government had reserved the land for but which
the state government did not regard as beneficial. I pointed out that under
the Supremacy Clause this simply could not happen, and that the nation
could acquire the water. I thought that if this myth were exposed, if the
need to use the reserved rights doctrine was shown to be non-existent,
Congress might be persuaded to eliminate the no-compensation feature of
reserved rights so that if and when the United States took the water from
Bergland's farm he would be paid the value that had been taken from
him.
Now the Solicitor wants to keep the federal cake and eat it too. He
wants federal reserved water rights for'reservations, and federal non-re-
served appropriations for non-reserved lands. The Solicitor thinks that the
federal non-reserved right looks very much like a state water right, with a
priority as of the date of actual use, and that there would be no conflict
with state systems except in some situations in which a state would not
recognize a federal use as beneficial or where instream flows needed for
federal purposes were not recognized as an appropriation under state
law. 69 He distinguishes substantive state water law and procedural state
water law and says that when the United States makes such an appropria-
in the few directives to federal agencies to use state water law, is there any general direction to
comply with state law. Id. at 569-70. He ignores the fact that a year previously the Supreme Court
had said that aside from reserved water the United States should acquire water in the same manner as
any other appropriator. See note 72 infra.
67. Opinion, supra note 47, at 575, quoting NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, WATER POLICIES
FoRrHE FTrrURE 466-67 (final report 1973).
68. Trelease, supra note 66, at 147i-471.
69. Opinion, supra note 47, at 574-76. The Solicitor does not say why this should be so. It might
be that if the United States merely seizes water in a manner inconsistent with state law, rather than
taking over a state created right which can be measuied by existing contours, or clearly establishing a
right that would fit in with state right patterns, harm could be done to many other persons. See Tre-
lease, supra note 66, at 227-30. We might be thrown back to the unhappy situation that existed in
Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963), in which state water law was relegated to the sole function of
determining the property rights for which compensation must be paid. But see California v. United
States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978).
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tion, the federal water right should be protected under state procedures as
a matter of policy, though not as a legal requirement. 70
He says this is the teeth of the Supreme Court's most recent pronounce-
ment on the subject-Mr. Justice Rehnquist's statement in United States
v. New Mexico, that when the United States has not reserved water,
"there arises the . . . inference that Congress intended . . . . that the
United States would acquire water in the same manner as any other public
or private appropriator." 71 The Justice thus finds an "implied section 8"
that requires the government to proceed in conformity with state law
rather than to seize the water as an exercise of raw power. 72 The Solicitor
labels this "dictum" 73 and prefers to rely on the statement in a prior case
dealing with the reserved right: "Federal water rights are not dependent
upon state law or state procedures. . .. ",74 This is surely a dictum when
applied to non-reserved rights. Yet Justice Rehnquist's statement seems
far more than mere dicta, in that it is aimed directly at the claimed water
right that brought the New Mexico case to the Supreme Court. It could
very well have been a deliberate attempt by the Justice to settle this phase
of federal-state controversy. He says that a careful examination of the
purposes for reserved rights is required "because of the history of con-
gressional intent in the field of federal-state jurisdiction with respect to
allocation of water. 75 He continues: "Where water is necessary to fulfill
the very purposes for which a federal reservation was created, it is reason-
able to conclude, even in the face of Congress' express deference to state
water law in other areas, that the United States intended to reserve the
necessary water.' '76 But then, if that intent cannot be found, "there arises
the contrary inference. . . . "77 He notes that Congress has appropriated
funds for the acquisition under state law of water to be used on federal
reservations. He notes that the agencies responsible for administering the
federal reservations have recognized Congress' intent to acquire under
state law any water not essential to the specific purpose of the reservation.
He rendered this opinion on the same day that he delivered the opinion in
California v. United States, which held that under the Reclamation Act of
1902 a state may impose any condition on the control, appropriation, use,
70. Opinion, supra note 47, at 577.
71. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 702 (1978).
72. Id. at 701-03. See note 18 and accompanying text supra.
73. Opinion, supra note 47, at 576.
74. Id., quoting Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 145 (1976).
75. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 701-02 (1978).
76. Id. at 702.
77. Id.
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or distribution of water in a federal reclamation project which is not in-
consistent with clear Congressional directives respecting the project. 78
All this is brushed aside as dicta, given no weight or credence, on the
basis that it is inconsistent with federal supremacy. The Solicitor does not
recognize that Mr. Justice Rehnquist is saying that Congress has exer-
cised its supreme powers by impliedly acceding to state law for the estab-
lishment of instream flows. He is too intent on finding a "congressionally
authorized program" on which to base federal appropriations of such
flows. He finds authority to claim them for the BLM in section 102 of the
1976 Federal Land Policy and Management Act:
(a) The Congress declares that it is the policy of the United States that-
(2) the national interest will be best realized if the public lands and
their. resources are periodically and systematically inventoried
and their present and future use is projected through a land use
planning process coordinated with other Federal and State plan-
ning efforts;
(8) the public lands be managed in a manner that will protect the
quality of scientific, scenic, historical, ecological, environmen-
tal, air and atmospheric, water resource, and archeological
values; that, where appropriate, will preserve and protect certain
public lands in their natural condition; that will provide food and
habitat for fish and wildlife and domestic animals; and that will
provide for outdoor recreation and human occupancy and use.79
On March 5, 1980, the United States filed in a Wyoming court a State-
ment of Claims that asserts the first "federal non-reserved rights." The
suit is one brought to settle all water rights to the Big Horn River and its
tributaries, all waters in a basin that covers one-fifth of the state. 80 Over
half the land is national forest or federal grazing land, but on the private
lands are cities, towns, ranches, irrigated farms, oil fields, coal mines,
and uranium mines-a prosperous and growing economy. The document
consists of seventeen pages of computer printout, listing on each line a
claimed appropriation of what seems to be the base flow of every creek
and rivulet in the basin that touches BLM land. The claimed priority date
is October 21, 1976, the date of the Federal Land Policy and Management
Act. The purpose claimed is to preserve and enhance the fisheries and
78. California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978).
79. 43 U.S.C. § 1701 (1976).
80. In re General Adjudication of All Water Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System
and Other Sources, Civ. No. 4993 (Dist. Ct. Wyo., filed Mar. 5, 1980).
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wildlife habitat on the federal land. After a preliminary survey, the State
Engineer of Wyoming said if these claims are sustained there will be no
water for any new appropriations for any private purpose. 81
It seems doubtful that these claims can rest on the quoted section of the
Act. That section does not, on its face, authorize anything; it is a declara-
tion of policy. To implement the policy the federal lands must be invento-
ried and identified, 82 and the Secretary of Interior must then develop
plans which can be implemented with "management decisions" after
public involvement and coordination with state and local plans. 83 The
plans will then control sales, withdrawals, acquisitions, exchanges, and
conveyances of the lands, and reservation and conveyance of minerals. 84
None of this has been done. Even if it were there is nothing in the Act to
authorize the appropriation of water. There is no section comparable to
the express authority given to the Secretary of Agriculture to appropriate
water for the national forests. 85 There is not a word about water in the
sixty-three pages of legislative history, nothing to indicate that Congress
intended such sweeping powers with such drastic effects. Most impor-
tant, another section of the Act seems directly to forbid the exercise of
such power. Section 701 (g)86 provides:
(g) Nothing in this Act shall be construed as limiting or restricting the
power and authority of the United States or
(1) as affecting in any way any law governing appropriation or use of,
or Federal right to, water on public lands;
(2) as expanding or diminishing Federal or State jurisdiction, responsi-
bility, interests, or rights in water resources development or con-
trol;
Yet the federal government's Statement of Claims 87 asserts that on the
day the Act was passed, by virtue of the Act itself, all these instream
appropriations sprang into life. Is not the United States claiming that a
federal right to water on public lands has been affected, that federal inter-
ests or rights have been expanded, and that state jurisdiction has been
diminished?
A similar exception might be taken to the Solicitor's claims to non-
reserved rights for public accommodations and recreation on the lands
81. Telephone conversation with George Christopolus, State Engineer of Wyoming (Mar. 27,
1980).
82. 43 U.S.C. § 1711 (1976).
83. 43 U.S.C. § 1712(1976).
84. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1713-1716, 1718 (1976).
85. Department of Agriculture Organic Act of 1944 § 213, 16 U.S.C. § 526 (1976).
86. 43 U.S.C. § 1701 note (1976).
87. See notes 80-81 and accompanying text supra.
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administered by the Fish and Wildlife Service. Claims of federal rights
for the National Wildlife Refuge System seem out of line, since the Or-
ganic Act for that system provides: "Nothing in this act shall constitute
an express or implied claim or denial on the part of the Federal Govern-
ment as to exemption from State water laws." 88 Is not the United States
expressly claiming exemption from state water law?
V. THE FUTURE FOR RESERVED AND NON-RESERVED
RIGHTS
In the quarter of a century since the United States Supreme Court dis-
covered the federal non-Indian reserved right, a great deal of energy has
been devoted to the effort to eliminate this "sword of Damocles" hang-
ing over western water rights.89 Perhaps not all that effort was tilting at
windmills, but the fact remains that we have yet to discover a single case
of harm to the holder of a state-created water right resulting from the ex-
ercise of a federal reserved right. One of the new developments that
prompted this paper confirms the belief that the federal non-Indian re-
served right is de minimis; the case of United States v. New Mexico se-
verely restricts its size to the minimum quantity essential to maintain the
reservation. 90
The two recent claims to new types of reserved rights do not seem to
add much of a threat. Quite probably no harm will result from the new
reserved right to groundwater for ecosystem maintenance (subirrigation?)
discovered by Task Force 5a 9l or from the expanded water hole reserva-
tion asserted by the Solicitor.92 As for the former, only in a very few
parks, monuments, and wildlife refuges would maintenance of surface
vegetation be so essential that the purpose of the reservation would fail
unless it were maintained. As for the waterholes, an unpleasant surprise
might be in store for post-1926 appropriators who take from these small
sources the surplus over stock water needs when they are challenged as
trespassers, 93 yet the likelihood seems small that the courts will uphold
the Solicitor's extravagant claims. The claim of the total available supply
seems inconsistent with the New Mexico stricture and it is hardly believ-
able that in 1910 Congress set up a system of federal private water rights
that supersedes the state system of appropriation in this tiny area.
88. 16 U.S.C. § 668(dd)(i) (1976).
89. Statement of Northcutt Ely, on behalf of the American Bar Association, before the National
Water Commission (Nov. 6, 1969).
90. See notes 29-34, 71-72 and accompanying text supra.
91. See notes 43-46 and accompanying text supra.
92. See notes 50-58 and accompanying text supra.
93. See note 58 and accompanying text supra.
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A similar question must be raised as to the practical importance of the
federal non-reserved water right. Will it be used by the government to
justify large federal projects? I think the answer is yes, in the sense that
the government will exercise national powers when it undertakes new ba-
sin-wide or interstate projects or uses water incidental to flood control and
navigation improvements, as it has in the past. 94 I think the answer is no,
if they are reclamation projects subject to the section 8 conformity re-
quirement, unless Congress gives a clear directive inconsistent with the
application of state law. 95 Will federal non-reserved rights be used to pro-
vide water for giant new steam power facilities, coal slurry pipelines, coal
gasification plants, and synthetic fuel plants constructed and operated by
the coal, electric, and energy industries but authorized and licensed by
federal legislation? The answer is no, if present readings of the mood of
Congress are accurate. Alert western congressmen have inserted into
pending bills for coal slurry pipelines and priority energy projects ("fast
track" legislation) provisions that require the United States or its per-
mitees or licensees to acquire water rights by complying with state
laws. 96 President Carter has stated his concurrence with these provi-
sions.97 Will federal non-reserved water rights be used to supply water for
the construction and operation of the MX missile system? Possibly. An
Undersecretary of the Air Force stated to a congressional committee that
the Air Force would prefer to comply with state water laws; but the White
House has not yet worked out a firm administrative position on this sensi-
tive issue. 98 No, said the Congressman from Nevada, legislation author-
izing the system will include the similar amendments to protect western in-
terests, including explicit congressional recognition of state rights in
water allocation. 99
94. See notes 16-18 and accompanying text supra.
95. 43 U.S.C. § 383 (1976); California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978). See text accom-
panying note 78 supra.
96. See H.R. 4370, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), accompanied by H.R. REP. No. 692 Part 1.
96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), and discussed in 125 CONG. REC. H10016-18 (daily ed. Oct. 31,
1979); H.R. 2610. 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); S. 1308, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), discussed in
125 CONG. REC. S 13925-27 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1979).
97. On October 10, 1979, at a "working dinner" attended by the President and six Western
Senators, the President stated:
I have and will continue to support legislative language to make it clear that federally-supported
energy development should be accomplished without preemption or change of state water laws.
rights or responsibilities. . . . We must respect the rights and responsibilities of our state gov-
ernments-and when the issue is priority of water use in a state, the state must and does have the
ability to say "no" through existing state water allocation systems.
WESTERN WATER NEWS, Oct. 12, 1979, at 2.
98. The Sacramento Bee, Jan. 28, 1980 (AP dispatch).
99. Id.
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VI. INSTREAM FLOWS
What is left, of any importance? The entire effort of the Task Force and
the Solicitor seems devoted to the establishment of instream flows on the
public lands administered by the Bureau of Land Management. Through-
out the Task Force Report the instream flow is identified over and over
again as the area of federal need most likely to suffer from state laws that
do not recognize the type of water right needed for federal programs. 100
The Solicitor's major claim is to instream flows to meet the "manage-
ment objectives" of the 1976 Federal Land Policy and Management
Act. 101
One might think from this federal sense of urgency that as a whole the
western states were inimical to instream flows. It is true that the West
has had a long struggle making the transition from pure utilitarianism to
recognition of these amenities. The history of this movement and the rich
variety of state authority available for the purpose are well docu-
mented. ' 02 The precedents go back over half a century, when the Oregon
legislature took the first step in 1915 and withdrew from appropriation the
streams forming the beautiful waterfalls along the Columbia River
gorge. 103 That state has since withdrawn many waters famous for steel-
head and salmon fishing. Idaho uses a similar technique; the legislature
has authorized the Governor or the State Park Board to appropriate spe-
cific beautiful lakes and streams in trust for the public. 104 In Colorado the
State Water Conservation Board can appropriate minimum flows "to pre-
serve the natural environment to a reasonable degree," 105 while in Mon-
tana, the state, any political subdivision or agency, or the United States
may apply to the Board of Natural Resources for a reservation of water to
maintain a minimum flow.106 In California and Oregon, wild rivers and
free flowing rivers have been legislatively established.107 In California
attempts by the state fish and game officials and a sportsmen's organiza-
tion to appropriate instream water for fishing have been blocked by the
100. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 28, at 13-16,39,44,48,73-74.
101. Opinion, supra note 47, at 615. See notes 79-86 and accompanying text supra.
102. Tarlock, Appropriation for Instream Flow Maintenance: A Progress Report on "New"
Public Western Water Rights, 1978 UTAH L. REv. 211; R. Dewsnup & D. Jensen, State Laws and
Instream Flows, (prepared for United States Department of Interior, Fish and Wildlife Service, Mar.
1977); Tarlock, Recent Developments in the Recognition of Instream Uses in Western Water Law,
1975 UTAH L. Rev. 871.
103. OR. REv. STAT. § 538.200 (1979).
104. IDAHO CODE §§ 67-4301 to-4304 (1973).
105. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-102 (1973).
106. MoNT. REv. CODES ANN. § 85-2-316 (1979).
107. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 5093.50 to -. 69 (West Supp. 1980); OR. Rev. STAT. § 390.805
(1979).
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courts for lack of diversion, 0 8 but the Water Resources Control Board is
studying regulations that could limit or prohibit further diversion permits
on certain streams. 109 In Washington, one instream appropriation by a
private person has been allowed, 10 and minimum flows can be set by
administrative agencies."I' In California and Alaska every permit appli-
cation is reviewed by fish and game officials. "12
Not every state has such laws. In some Rocky Mountain States, where
the streams are fully or over appropriated and there is little activity in the
granting of new permits, no action has been taken. In both Wyoming and
Alaska bills to establish procedures for obtaining minimum flows have
been rejected by the legislatures, but even this represents a conscious
choice by the policy-making body of the state. One reason for lack of
interest in the Wyoming legislation was that early downstream priorities
guarantee upstream instream flows; prior rights on the prairies insure that
water will flow in the mountain canyons. 1 3 And in all of these states the
water officials can protect an instream flow by denying or conditioning a
permit in the name of the public interest. 114
These decisions and processes are planning tools, the devices used by
states to control and manage their future. A state may plan for economic
growth and development, and it may plan for outdoor enjoyment and rec-
reation. It can do both, since prosperity and progress demand recreation
and a pleasing environment. Some uses of water are private and create
wealth, while others are public and produce other satisfactions. The pro-
prietary uses are usually for irrigation, municipal, manufacturing, food
processing, and power production purposes, although resorts may cater to
vacationers and sportsmen. The public uses are primarily for recreation,
scenic, boating, fishing, swimming, hiking, fish propagation, wildlife
habitat, and environmental and ecological values. Instream flows mean
homes for trout and salmon, a delight to the eye, sport for the fisherman.
They may also mean locked-up streams-no water for increased irriga-
tion and food production, for industry, jobs, or city growth. The question
is, who decides the mix?
108. Fullerton v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 90 Cal. App. 3d 590, 153 Cal. Rptr. 518
(1979); California Trout, Inc. v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 90 Cal. App. 3d 816. 153 Cal.
Rptr. 672 (1969).
109. The Sacramento Bee, Feb. 17, 1980.
110. Bevan v. State Department of Ecology, PCHB No. 48 (1972).
111. E.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 90.22.010 (1979).
112. ALASKA STAT. § 46.15.080 (1977); CAL. WATER CODE § 1257 (West 197 1).
113. F. Trelease, Il, Hydrology and Water Law (Water Law and Management Seminar. In-
stream Flow Group, Ft. Collins, Colorado, Sept. 1979).
114. ALASKA STAT. § 46.15.080 (1977); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-143 (Supp. 1979-1980):
NEV. REV. STAT. § 533.370 (1979); Wyo. STAT. § 41-4-503 (1977).
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All of the devices for reserving streams, establishing free flowing riv-
ers, controlling appropriations, appropriating instream flows, setting min-
imum flows-and even the lack of any of these-are choices made by
legislatures, officials, and agencies of the states. In each state these deci-
sions, processes, and results represent a balance between public and pri-
vate interests, between the wealth-producing and the amenity-preserving
pressures faced by local politicians.
What Governor Matheson and state water administrators all over the
West fear is that in the future these balances will not be tested. The sole
question may be: "Will this piece of federal land be benefitted by main-
taining a flowing stream?" In large areas of the West there will be no
opportunity to balance interests, compare uses, choose between uses, or
choose alternative uses. The development of a particular state could be
controlled not by. what state legislators, officials, and agencies feel is
good for the state, but by what federal regional officials think is good for
the public land within the state. Where the state has struck a balance it
may be upset. If no provision has been made for instream flows because
of a desire to use the water for the future growth of cities, food produc-
tion, or energy production, the waters will nevertheless be withdrawn.
Where the state has struck its balance in favor of some instream uses with
its program of wild rivers, state-selected recreation sites, and state-set
minimum flows, it may find that balance upset by a large federal program
added on top of the state program, going far beyond the line the state
authorities have drawn.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Task Force and the Solicitor argue that if the federal agencies must
follow state law, the application of federal law will not be uniform
throughout the states, and the effect of federal programs will differ from
state to state. This is anathema to the Task Force. Its report asserts a "na-
tional interest in management of federal lands which cannot be limited by
state lines." 115 The report points out that Congress has designated pur-
poses as diverse as protecting fish and wildlife habitat, safeguarding lands
through watershed protection, producing food and fiber for the nation's
needs, meeting national energy goals, providing for the national demand
for outdoor recreation, and preserving ecosystems in their natural condi-
tion. 116 Yet even if these are national purposes, quite obviously there can-
not be national uniformity in their implementation. The same measures
115. TASK FoRcE REPoRT, supra note 28, at 13.
116. Id.
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would not be taken in Arizona as in Alaska. We are back to the same
question: "Since there will inevitably be differences, who will decide the
proper local use of water?"
At least for the Forest Service these differences are to be resolved ac-
cording to the different state laws. The Supreme Court said in United
States v. New Mexico' 17 that, in establishing the national forests, Con-
gress intended that for certain purposes the Forest Service should have
reserved rights, but for other purposes it must look to state law. Congress'
intention was to allow instream flows in the forests to the extent that state
law allows them. Although the Solicitor thinks Mr. Justice Rehnquist's
statement was dictum, he said very clearly that when the Forest Service
wants an instream flow, Congress intended that the United States would
acquire the water right in the same manner as any other public or private
appropriator-according to state law."18 This appears to be a deliberate
choice between nationwide uniformity and intrastate conformity.
In California v. United States,"19 the Court emphasizes the physical
and climatic differences between the western states as justifications for
section 8 of the Reclamation Act, which mandates that state law shall
govern reclamation projects for the production of food and fiber. Why
should not the same be true of instream flows? Considering that Mr. Jus-
tice Rehnquist handed down California v. United States, and United
States v. New Mexico on the same day, and that in New Mexico he cited
California, it seems reasonable to believe that his justification for state-
to-state variation of federal reclamation projects carried over to justify his
quite specific ruling that national forests' claims to instream flows should
be governed by state law. Is there any reason to believe that the Court will
not apply this same treatment to BLM lands? Since the Solicitor does not
admit the possibility, he gives no argument against it. Since my sympa-
thies are obviously elsewhere, I find it difficult to think of any.
I think it very likely that the federal non-reserved right to appropriate
instream flows on the public domain without regard to state law will have
a short life. But if I am wrong on the law of federalism and the Solicitor's
arguments carry the day in court, other voices might carry the day in Con-
gress. If federal uniformity means that claims such as those filed in the
Big Horn Basin of Wyoming 120 will blanket the western public lands,
Governor Matheson will surely raise his voice, and he will be leader of a
chorus. Although a generation of "Barrett bills" to abolish reserved
117. 438 U.S. 696, 702 (1978).
118. See notes 72-78 and accompanying text supra.
119. 438 U.S. 645, 649 (1978).
120. See note 80 and accompanying text supra.
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rights failed in Congress,12' a bill to restrict non-reserved rights might
well fare better. Congress is alert to the problem, as the slurry pipeline
and energy mobilization bills demonstrate. 122 We in the West no longer
fear that "the Feds" will take Bergland's water from him and set him to
selling apples in the street. But we know that the federal government has
the power to override state laws, because we have seen it in air and water
pollution control. 123 If Congress decides this country needs the MX mis-
sile and authorizes its construction in Utah, Governor Matheson and the
Utah State Engineer know that they could not (and of course they would
not try to) block it by denying the water to the federal government be-
cause they wanted the water to be used for other purposes. The national
security has supremacy over the interests of a single state.
But if there is real ground for Governor Matheson and the rest of us to
fear that "the Feds" will take our future from us and override our plans
and our decisions in the name of single-purpose management of the fed-
eral lands, I believe Congress would be willing to say that federal supre-
macy over desert and tundra, barren mountain and sagebrush grassland,
does not require federal domination of water to the exclusion of state de-
sires for multiple-purpose development. The time may well be ripe for the
enactment of a universal "section 8" calling for conformity to state law
whenever the government, as a land manager, is in competition with
other land and property managers. 124
121. Morreale, Federal-State Conflicts Over Western Waters-A Decade of Attempted "Clarify-
ing Legislation," 20 RuTGERS L. REv. 423,423 (1966).
122. See note 96 supra.
123. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376(1976); 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (II Supp. 1978).
124. A commendable new approach to such legislation is being drafted by Charles B. Roe, Jr.,
Senior Assistant Attorney General for the State of Washington, and Wilbur Hallauer, Director, State
of Washington Department of Ecology. The unpublished draft bill in part calls for (1) quantification
of all reserved rights, (2) termination of unexercised non-Indian reserved rights, (3) a federal water
project fund to provide water to Indian reservations. Both the National Association of Attorneys
General and the Conference of Western Attorneys General have endorsed the concepts of the bill in
principle.
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